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Abstract
Formal speciﬁcation provides a system description that is much more precise than the natural
language one and it can help to solve a lot of speciﬁcation problems. But even a formal speciﬁcation
of a system can contain mistakes or can disagree with system’s requirements. To cover this, we
integrate a speciﬁcation framework with a veriﬁcation system. Given a system, represented in a
formal speciﬁcation framework Focus, one can verify its properties by translating the speciﬁcation
to a Higher-Order Logic and subsequently using the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. Moreover, using
this approach one can validate the reﬁnement relation between two given systems. The approach
uses the idea of reﬁnement-based veriﬁcation: we see any proof about a system as the proof that
a more concrete system speciﬁcation is a reﬁnement of a more abstract one. The case when one
needs to prove a single property of a system speciﬁcation can also be seen as a reﬁnement relation:
this property can be deﬁned as a Focus speciﬁcation itself and then one needs just show that the
system speciﬁcation is its reﬁnement. The major aspects of this approach are exempliﬁed here by
a case study on telematics (electronic data transmission) gateway.
Keywords: Formal Speciﬁcation, Veriﬁcation, Reﬁnement, Real-Time Systems, Automotive Gate-
way
1 Motivation
The correctness of a system according to a given speciﬁcation is essential,
especially for safety-critical applications. Using formal methods we can not
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only test correctness and safety, which is not enough for such kinds of inter-
active systems, but also prove them: veriﬁcation guarantees fulﬁllment of the
requirements. A formal speciﬁcation is in general more precise than a natural
language one, but it can also contain mistakes or disagree with requirements.
Therefore, for safety critical systems it is not enough to have detached formal
speciﬁcations, we also need to validate and to verify them to be sure that the
speciﬁcation conforms to its requirements and is consistent.
We can treat any proof about a system as the proof that a more concrete
system speciﬁcation is a reﬁnement of a more abstract one. The case when
one needs to prove a single property of a system speciﬁcation S can also be
seen as a reﬁnement relation: this property can be deﬁned as a Focus spec-
iﬁcation S ′ itself and then one needs just show that the system speciﬁcation
S is a reﬁnement of the speciﬁcation S ′. We call this view reﬁnement-based
veriﬁcation. In the context of hardware and software systems, the deﬁnition
of (formal) veriﬁcation is the act of proving or disproving the correctness of
a system with respect to a certain formal speciﬁcation or property, using for-
mal methods of mathematics, where the deﬁnition of validation is the quality
control and testing tasks and techniques used to determine if a work product
(either an application or one of its components) conforms to its speciﬁed re-
quirements, including operational, quality, interface, and design constraints.
Thus, the veriﬁcation means to proof properties of a system (more precisely,
of a system speciﬁcation) as some lemmas, where validation means to show
that a more concrete speciﬁcation fulﬁlls all the properties of a more abstract
one, i.e. that the reﬁnement relation between these speciﬁcations holds. These
concepts are very similar. Moreover, we can see veriﬁcation of a system as a
special case of validation: if the property to prove is presented as an abstract
speciﬁcation, it remains to validate the system speciﬁcation with respect to
these abstract speciﬁcation, i.e. to show that the reﬁnement relation holds.
In this paper we present the ideas of the reﬁnement-based veriﬁcation using
a framework “Focus on Isabelle” [9]. Given system and requirements speciﬁ-
cations, represented in a formal speciﬁcation framework Focus, our method
validates the reﬁnement relation between them by translating the speciﬁca-
tions to a Higher Order Logic and subsequent using the theorem prover Is-
abelle/HOL. In order to design systems in a step-wise, modular style we use
Focus [5], a framework for formal speciﬁcations and development of interac-
tive systems. Focus is preferred here over other speciﬁcation frameworks since
it has an integrated notion of time and modeling techniques for unbounded
networks, provides a number of speciﬁcation techniques for distributed systems
and concepts of reﬁnement. For example, the B-method [2] is used in many
publications on fault-tolerant systems, but it has neither graphical represen-
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tations nor integrated notion of time. Moreover, the B-method also is slightly
more low-level and more focused on the reﬁnement to code rather than formal
speciﬁcation. Formal speciﬁcations of real-life systems can become very large
and complex, and are as a result hard to read and to understand. Therefore,
it is too complicated to start the speciﬁcation process in some low-level frame-
work, First-Order or Higher-Order Logic etc. directly. To avoid this problem
Focus supports a graphical speciﬁcation style based on tables and diagrams.
In our approach we chose a prover for Higher-Order Logic, because the power
of First-Order Logic is not enough to represent in a direct way several speciﬁ-
cations of distributed interactive systems. As the veriﬁcation system we have
chosen Isabelle/HOL [8,11], an interactive semi-automatic theorem prover for
Higher-Order Logic. The disadvantage of only semi-automated proofs is com-
pensated by the advantage of using Higher-Order Logic.
The whole and detailed description of the framework “Focus on Isabelle”
is presented in [9]. In this paper we show the application of its main con-
tributions on the example of a veriﬁed speciﬁcation of telematics (electronic
data transmission) gateway for an automated emergency call. According to
the proposal by the European Commission [1], such an automated emergency
call should become mandatory in all new cars as of 2009. The gateway system
itself is simple enough to be sketched in a few paragraphs, but it still pos-
sesses typical properties of such kind of systems and is very well suited for our
method – its domain is safety-critical real-time applications, the system has
a number of reﬁnement layers. The speciﬁcations and their veriﬁcation of the
corresponding emergency call application and of the communication within a
vehicle were introduced in [3] and in [7] respectively. Here we concentrate only
on the gateway speciﬁcation.
Outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we intro-
duce Focus and the representation of its major concepts in Isabelle/HOL. In
Section 3 we discuss the ideas of the so-called reﬁnement-based veriﬁcation. In
Section 4 we describe the application of represented ideas within a case study
– a veriﬁed speciﬁcation of the automotive gateway. Finally, in Section 5 we
summarize the presented work.
2 FOCUS on Isabelle
This section provides a short introduction to Isabelle/HOL and to Focus, as
well as the main points technique and methodology of translation from Focus
speciﬁcations into ones in Isabelle/HOL.
A mapping of operators in Focus to the corresponding deﬁnitions in HOL
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alone is not suﬃcient for the method to become easy. Because of this, we also
need a speciﬁcation and proof methodology. The main point in our method-
ology is an alignment on the future proofs to make them simpler and appro-
priate for application not only in theory but also in practice. For this we have
performed a number of case studies, whose results have helped us to ﬁnd out
diﬀerent problem points 3 and corresponding solutions for the coupling Focus
and Isabelle/HOL. The proofs of some system properties can take considerable
(human) time since the Isabelle/HOL is not fully automated. But considering
our framework “Focus on Isabelle” [9] we can inﬂuence on the complexity
of proofs already doing the speciﬁcation of systems and their properties, e.g.
modifying (reformulating) speciﬁcation to simplify the Isabelle/HOL proofs
for a translated Focus speciﬁcation. Thus, the speciﬁcation and veriﬁca-
tion/validation methodologies are treated as a single, joined, methodology
with the main focus on the speciﬁcation part. For this purpose we introduce
a number of additional Focus operators 4 . At the most cases we advise to
specify the input/output relation on the streams based on time intervals. Ar-
gumentation over time intervals of streams help us have not only more clear
and readable Focus speciﬁcations, but also simpler and shorter proofs in
Isabelle/HOL.
2.1 FOCUS and Isabelle/HOL
A distributed system in Focus is represented by its components 5 . Compo-
nents that are connected by communication lines called channels, can interact
or work independently of each other. The channels in Focus are asynchronous
communication links without delays. They are directed, reliable, and order
preserving. Via these channels components exchange information in terms of
messages of speciﬁed types. The formal meaning of a Focus speciﬁcation
is a relation between the communication histories for the external input and
output channels. The speciﬁcations can be structured into a number of for-
mulas each characterizing a diﬀerent kind of property, the most prominent
classes of them are safety and liveness properties. Focus supports a variety
of speciﬁcation styles which describe system components by logical formulas
or by diagrams and tables representing logical formulas.
Isabelle [8] is implemented in the functional programming language ML.
The base types in Isabelle/HOL are bool, the type of truth values and nat, the
type of natural numbers. The base type constructors are list, the type of lists,
3 Like representation of mutually recursive functions, speciﬁcation replications, sheaves of
channels, a large number of reﬁnement layers, etc.
4 In this paper we discuss only these Focus operators, which are used in the case study.
5 A component in Focus means a “logical component” and not a physical one.
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and set, the type of sets. Function types are denoted by⇒. The type variables
are denoted by ’a, ’b etc. Terms in Isabelle/HOL are formed as in functional
programming by applying functions to arguments. Terms may also contain λ-
abstractions. To specify a system with Isabelle means creating theories, which
are named collection of types, functions (constants), and theorems (lemmas).
For a detailed description of Isabelle/HOL see [8] and [11].
2.2 Concept of Streams
The central concept in Focus are streams, that represent communication
histories of directed channels. Streams in Focus are functions mapping the
indexes in their domains to their messages. For any set of messages M , M ω
denotes the set of all streams, M∞ and M ∗ denote the sets of all inﬁnite and
all ﬁnite streams respectively. M ω denotes the set of all timed streams, M∞
and M ∗ denote the sets of all inﬁnite and all ﬁnite timed streams respectively.
A timed stream is represented by a sequence of messages and time ticks, the
messages are also listed in their order of transmission. The ticks model a
discrete notion of time.
The timed domain is the most important one for representation of dis-
tributed systems with real-time requirements. Speciﬁcations of embedded
systems must be timed, because by representing a real-time system as an un-
timed speciﬁcation a number of properties of the system are loosed (e.g. the
causality property) that are not only very important for the system, but also
help us to make proofs easier. The deﬁnition in Isabelle/HOL of the Focus
stream types is given below. Another ways of streams formalizations as well
as the related work for the approach “Focus on Isabelle” are discussed in [9].
• Finite untimed streams of type ’a are represented by the list type: ’a list.
This type will be used to argue about a sequence of messages that are
transmitted during a time unit.
• Finite timed streams of type ’a are represented by the type ’a list list,
which will be used to argue about a timed stream that was truncated at
some point of time – each list here represents a sequences of messages
that are transmitted during the corresponding time unit.
• Inﬁnite untimed streams, nat ⇒ ’a, will be used to represent in Is-
abelle/HOL the local variables from Focus speciﬁcations.
• Inﬁnite timed streams of type ’a are represented by the type ’a istream
that represents the functional type nat ⇒ ’a list. For specifying the input
and the output streams to represent the behavior of an embedded system
only this kind of streams is used – timed streams must be inﬁnite because
time never halts.
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To simplify the speciﬁcation of the real-time systems we introduce an addi-
tional Focus operator ti(s , n) that yields the list of messages that are in the
timed stream s between the ticks n−1 and n (at the nth time unit). According
to our representation of the timed Focus streams this operator corresponds
in Isabelle/HOL simply to s n.
The predicate ts holds for a timed stream s , iﬀ s is time-synchronous in
the sense that exactly one message is transmitted in each time interval.
We deﬁne an Isabelle/HOL predicate msg n s that is equal modulo syntax
to the Focus operator msgn(s), which holds for a timed stream s , if this
stream contains at every time unit at most n messages.
2.3 Speciﬁcations and the Concept of Reﬁnement
Focus speciﬁcations can be elementary or composite. Any elementary Focus
speciﬁcation has the following syntax:
Name (Parameter Declarations) Frame Labels
in Input Declarations
out Output Declarations
Body
Name is the name of the speciﬁcation; Frame Labels lists a number of frame
labels, e.g. untimed, timed or time-synchronous, that correspond to the stream
types in the speciﬁcation (see Sect. 2.2); Parameter Declarations lists a num-
ber of parameters (optional); Input Declarations and Output Declarations list
the declarations of input and output channels respectively. Body characterizes
the relation between the input and output streams, and can be a number of
formulas, or a table, or diagram or a combination of them.
Deﬁnition 2.1 For any elementary timed parameterized speciﬁcation S we
deﬁne its semantics, written 〚S 〛, to be the formula:
iS ∈ I∞S ∧ pS ∈ PS ∧ oS ∈ O∞S ∧ BS (1)
where iS and oS denote lists of input and output channel identiﬁers, IS and
OS denote their corresponding types, pS denotes the list of parameters and
PS denotes their types, BS is a formula in predicate logic that describes the
body of the speciﬁcation S . 
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To deﬁne the semantics of a timed speciﬁcation in Isabelle/HOL we intro-
duce ﬁrst tree predicates, inStream, outStream, and locStream over inﬁnite timed
streams. The predicate inStream/outStream/locStream is true, if the channel iden-
tiﬁer corresponds to an input/output/local stream. Now we can deﬁne the se-
mantics of an elementary timed speciﬁcation with the input channels i1, . . . , in
and the output channels o1, . . . , om (and with parameters p1, . . . , pk) in Is-
abelle/HOL in the same way as it is deﬁned in Focus:
n∧
1
inStream(ij ) ∧
m∧
1
outStream(oj ) ∧ body (2)
where the Isabelle/HOL predicate body describes here the relation (with k
extra parameters) between the input and output streams and is equal modulo
syntax to BS that is conjunction of all propositions in the body of the speciﬁ-
cation S ). The order of the parameters in the relation must be the following
one: number of channels in the sheaf, input streams, speciﬁcation parameters,
output streams. For the proofs of the properties we need only the predicate
body. Therefore, only this part will be denoted later as semantic of the spec-
iﬁcation. The conjunction of the predicates inStream/outStream/locStream will
be deﬁned in Isabelle/HOL separately, because this part will be used only to
show that the correctness of syntactic interface. 6
Composite speciﬁcations are built hierarchically from elementary ones us-
ing constructors for composition and network description and can be repre-
sented in the graphical, the constraint and operator style. Semantics of a
composite Focus speciﬁcation is deﬁned in [5] as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.2 For any composite speciﬁcation S consisting of n subspeciﬁ-
cations S1, . . . , Sn , we deﬁne its semantics, written 〚S 〛, to be the formula:
〚S 〛 def= ∃ lS ∈ L∞S :
n∧
j=1
〚Sj 〛 (3)
where lS denotes a list of local channel identiﬁers and LS denotes their corre-
sponding types. 
To simplify the Isabelle/HOL proofs we split the speciﬁcation semantics into
3 parts (see Equation 2): input and output streams, as well as the semantic of
the speciﬁcation body. The semantics of the body of a composite speciﬁcation
S in Isabelle/HOL is a predicate
6 The signature of the corresponding predicate will be equal to the signature of the pred-
icate body.
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∃ lS ∈ istreamS :
n∧
j=1
predicateSj (4)
where lS denotes a list of local channel identiﬁers and istreamS denotes their
corresponding types, and predicateSj denotes the predicate that is a represen-
tation in Isabelle/HOL of the Focus speciﬁcation Sj . The representation of
the parts responsible for syntactic interface is done in the similar way.
To prove that a system speciﬁcation fulﬁlls its requirements the idea of
reﬁnement can be used. In Focus we can have a general speciﬁcation S0 of
a system that corresponds to the formalization of system requirements. To
show that a concrete speciﬁcation Sn , which we get after n reﬁnement steps,
fulﬁlls the system requirements, we only need to show that the speciﬁcation
Sn is a reﬁnement of the speciﬁcation S0.
The Focus speciﬁcation framework uses three basic reﬁnement relations:
Behavioral Reﬁnement:
The related speciﬁcations S1 and S2 must have the same syntactic in-
terface. The reﬁned speciﬁcation S2 may meet further requirements in
addition to the requirements on the more abstract speciﬁcation S1. At
the same time, the more concrete speciﬁcation S2 must meet all the re-
quirements on the speciﬁcation S1. This kind of reﬁnement is used to
reduce the number of possible output histories for a given input history.
Interface Reﬁnement:
This kind of reﬁnement is a generalization of the behavioral reﬁnement, it
allows to work on the diﬀerent levels of interface abstraction: the related
speciﬁcations S1 and S2 may have diﬀerent syntactic interface.
Conditional Reﬁnement:
The conditional reﬁnement is a generalization of the interface reﬁnement,
it allows the introduction of additional input assumptions.
We are using here the deﬁnitions of the behavioral reﬁnement from [5].
Deﬁnition 2.3 A speciﬁcation S2 is called a behavioral reﬁnement (S1  S2)
of a speciﬁcation S1 if they have the same syntactic interface and any I/O
history of S2 is also an I/O history of S1. 
Therefore, in order to show that our concrete speciﬁcation S2 fulﬁlls the system
requirements S1, we only need to show that 〚S2〛 ⇒ 〚S1〛, i.e. the relation 
of behavioral reﬁnement is deﬁned by equivalence
(S1  S2)⇐⇒ (〚S2〛 ⇒ 〚S1〛) (5)
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Formally, we need to show that any I/O history of S2 is an I/O history of S1,
but S1 may have additional I/O histories. In Isabelle it means to prove that the
formula that corresponds to the semantics of the speciﬁcation body 〚S2〛 im-
plies the formula that corresponds to 〚S1〛. This deﬁnition of reﬁnement does
not exclude that the set of I/O histories of S2 can be empty. It means 〚S2〛 is
false 7 and the reﬁnement relation is true. Thus, this point must be also taken
into account proving the reﬁnement relation in Isabelle/HOL. The veriﬁcation
of the property that both speciﬁcations have the same syntactic interface will
be done separately.
3 Reﬁnement-Based Veriﬁcation
In Focus we can have a general speciﬁcation S0 of a system that corresponds
to the formalization of system requirements. Therefore, in order to show
that our concrete speciﬁcation Sn that we get after n reﬁnement steps fulﬁlls
the system requirements, we only need to show that the speciﬁcation Sn is a
reﬁnement [5,4,6] of the speciﬁcation S0. In this context, it is an important
point what exactly a developer means by “reﬁnement” on each reﬁnement step
(a behavioral reﬁnement, an interface reﬁnement, or a conditional reﬁnement,
changing time granularity etc.) and which speciﬁcation semantics is used.
In this section we introduce ﬁrst of all the representation of the reﬁnement
layers of a speciﬁcation group and the general ways of their representation
in Isabelle/HOL. After that we discuss the representation in Isabelle/HOL of
behavioral reﬁnement 8 and how the ideas of the reﬁnement-based veriﬁcation
can be used.
3.1 Reﬁnement Layers of a Speciﬁcation Group
Figure 1 represents the hierarchy in a speciﬁcation group S in general. It has
m reﬁnement layers:
• speciﬁcation S 1 is a reﬁnement speciﬁcation of S ,
• . . . ,
• S j is a composition of speciﬁcations S j1 , . . . , S
j
n (where for the speciﬁ-
cations S j1 , . . . , S
j
n the reﬁnement layer j is the most abstract one) that
builds a reﬁnement of S j−1.
• . . . ,
7 This can happen if the speciﬁcation S2 is inconsistent.
8 For the details of representation in Isabelle/HOL of interface and conditional reﬁnement
we refer to the [9].
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• Smi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a composition of speciﬁcations Sm1,k1, . . . , Smn,kn that
builds a reﬁnement of Sm−1, where the speciﬁcations Sm1,k1, . . . , S
m
n,kn are
elementary ones.
The number N of all speciﬁcation in the group is larger or equal 9 to the
number of layers.
S
SnjS1j
SnmS1m
Sj-1
Sj
«
«
«
«
«
Sn,knSn,1 «S1,k1S1,1 «
Layer  0
Layer  j-1
Layer  j
Layer  m
« «
Fig. 1. Reﬁnement Layers of a Speciﬁcation Group S
3.2 Behavioral Reﬁnement
According to the deﬁnition of behavioral reﬁnement (Deﬁnition 2.3), in order
to show that the more concrete speciﬁcation S2 (e.g. a speciﬁcation of a system
architecture) fulﬁlls the more abstract S1 (e.g. system requirements), we only
need to show
〚S2〛 ⇒ 〚S1〛 (6)
In Isabelle it means to prove that the formula that corresponds to 〚S2〛 implies
the formula that corresponds to 〚S1〛.
Deﬁnitions 2.1 and 2.2 (semantics of an elementary and a composite spec-
iﬁcation respectively) imply that the semantics of any Focus speciﬁcation S
9 Equality is possible only in the case, when we do not have any compositional speciﬁcation
in the group.
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can be represented by
iS ∈ I∞S ∧ oS ∈ O∞S ∧ BS (7)
where iS and oS denote sets of input and output channel identiﬁers, IS and
OS denote their corresponding types, and BS is a logic formula. In the case
of composite speciﬁcation consisting of n subspeciﬁcations S1, . . . , Sn :
• The formula 〚BS 〛 is equal to formula
∃ lS ∈ L∞S :
∧n
j=1 〚BSj 〛
where lS denotes a list of local channel identiﬁers and LS denotes their
corresponding types, and BSj denotes the logic formula describing the
body of the speciﬁcation Sj .
• The lists of input and output channel identiﬁers, iS and oS , is a concate-
nation of corresponding lists of speciﬁcations S1, . . . , Sn , except those that
are used as local channels (belong to lS ).
Together with Equation 5, this implies that the formal deﬁnition of the be-
havioral reﬁnement [5] allows that the reﬁned speciﬁcation may have more
input and output channels in addition to the input and output channels of
the abstract speciﬁcation. Let the speciﬁcation S2 be a behavioral reﬁnement
of the speciﬁcation S1 in the meaning of Deﬁnition 2.3: S1  S2. According
to the Equation 7 the semantics of these speciﬁcation can be represented as
follows:
〚S1〛 = iS1 ∈ I∞S1 ∧ oS1 ∈ O∞S1 ∧ BS1
〚S2〛 = iS2 ∈ I∞S2 ∧ oS2 ∈ O∞S2 ∧ BS2
Then, according to the Equation 5 we can conclude the following:
(S1  S2) ⇐⇒
(〚S2〛 ⇒ 〚S1〛) ⇔
(iS2 ∈ I∞S2 ∧ oS2 ∈ O∞S2 ∧ BS2) ⇒ (iS1 ∈ I∞S1 ∧ oS1 ∈ O∞S1 ∧ BS1)
⇔
(iS2 ∈ I∞S2 ⇒ iS1 ∈ I∞S1 ) ∧ (oS2 ∈ O∞S2 ⇒ oS1 ∈ O∞S1 ) ∧ (BS2 ⇒ BS1)
The conjunct iS2 ∈ I∞S2 ⇒ iS1 ∈ I∞S1 means that the set of input channels of
the speciﬁcation S1 is a subset of the set of input channels of the speciﬁcation
S2: iS2 ⊆ iS1 , and the conjunct oS2 ∈ O∞S2 ⇒ oS1 ∈ O∞S1 means that the set of
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output channels of the speciﬁcation S1 is a subset of the set of output channels
of the speciﬁcation S2: oS2 ⊆ oS1 .
For the cases when the more strict version of behavioral reﬁnement is
needed, where both speciﬁcations (an abstract one and a reﬁned one) must
have exactly the same syntactic interface. Thus, we introduce a new deﬁnition
of the behavioral reﬁnement – the strict behavioral reﬁnement.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A speciﬁcation S2 is called a strict behavioral reﬁnement (S1 
S2) of a speciﬁcation S1 if
• they have exactly the same syntactic interface and
• any I/O history of S2 is also an I/O history of S1.
We deﬁne the relation  of strict behavioral reﬁnement by equivalence
(S1  S2)
⇔
((iS1 ∈ I∞S1 = iS2 ∈ I∞S2 ) ∧ (oS1 ∈ O∞S1 = oS2 ∈ O∞S2 ) ∧ (BS2 ⇒ BS1))
(8)
where iS1 and iS2 (oS1 and oS2) denote lists of input (output) channel identiﬁers
of the speciﬁcations S1 and S2 respectively, IS1 , IS2 , OS1 and OS2 denote their
corresponding types, BS1 and BS2 are logic formulas in terms of the Equation 7.

The deﬁnition of reﬁnement does not exclude that the set of I/O histories of
S2 is empty. It means 〚S2〛 is false and the reﬁnement relation is true. This
can happen if the speciﬁcation S2 is inconsistent.
3.3 Veriﬁcation
We can see any proof about a system as the proof that a more concrete system
speciﬁcation is a reﬁnement of a more abstract one: if the property to prove
is presented as an abstract speciﬁcation, it remains to validate the system
speciﬁcation with respect to these abstract speciﬁcation, i.e. to show that the
reﬁnement relation holds.
For example, the speciﬁcation S fulﬁlls the property P1 and P2 under
assumption that the properties A1, A2 and A3 hold. Thus, the speciﬁcation
S can be seen as
• a (behavioral) reﬁnement of the speciﬁcation S ′ that is combination of
assumptions A1, A2, A3 and guarantee P1.
• a (behavioral) reﬁnement of the speciﬁcation S ′′ that is combination of
assumption assumptions A1, A2, A3 and guarantee P2.
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In most cases a system must be veriﬁed with respect not to a single property,
but with respect to a number of properties. In this case it is more suﬃcient
to specify these properties as a single speciﬁcation to exclude possible incon-
sistencies. Therefore, we verify that the speciﬁcation SR is a (behavioral)
reﬁnement of the speciﬁcation S that is combination of assumption A1, A2,
A3 and guarantee P1 ∧ P2.
Let S be some speciﬁcation of a system and let a speciﬁcation L consist
of properties L1, . . . ,Ln of this system. The corresponding reﬁnement lemma
looks like [[S ]] ⇒ [[L]]. Applying the deﬁnition of the Isabelle/HOL predicate
which corresponds to [[L]] we get
[[S ]]⇒ ([[L1]] ∧ · · · ∧ [[Ln ]])
Then we can split the veriﬁcation goal into n subgoals, each of them can be
proved as a separate lemma:
[[S ]]⇒ [[L1]]
. . .
[[S ]]⇒ [[Ln ]]
In some cases the requirements (properties) can be sorted to get a nested
hierarchy. Assuming e.g. the following two requirements, namely L1 and L2,
of some system S1 that has an output channel y of type N:
∀ t ∈ N : ti(y , t) = 〈〉 (9)
and
∀ t ∈ N : #ti(y , t) = 2 (10)
The second requirement, L2, is a reﬁnement of the ﬁrst one, L1. Therefore,
if we show that the system S1 fulﬁlls the second requirement, we do not need
to show that it fulﬁlls the ﬁrst requirement, but we need to show that the
reﬁnement relation between L1 and L2 holds, which in most cases is easer
than to show that S1 fulﬁlls L1.
Assuming a system S with corresponding list of requirements L = [L1, . . . ,Ln ]:
[[S ]]⇒ [[L]]
where
[[L]] = [[L1]] ∧ · · · ∧ [[Ln ]]
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For any new requirement R on the system S that we need to add to the list
of its requirements L, L ∪ {R} (assuming R does not belong to the list of
requirements) we can have the following cases.
(1) The system S has some requirement Li that is less abstract than R:
R ∈ L ∧ ∃Li ∈ L : Li ⇒ R.
We add R to the next level of abstraction L′ (to the list with more
abstract requirements, [[L]] ⇒ [[L′]]) using the same schema: L′ ∪ {R},
see Figure 2 (a).
(2) The list of requirements of the system S has a requirement that is more
abstract than R:
R ∈ L ∧ ∃Li ∈ L : R ⇒ Li .
We replace the requirement Li in L by R, Li will be added to the next
level of abstraction L′ (to the list with more abstract requirements), see
Figure 2 (b). If S does not fulﬁll R, then S must be changed according
to the new list of requirements.
(3) The system S has no requirements that are in some relation (more/less
abstract) to R (R opens some new “dimension” of S ):
R ∈ L ∧ ∀Li ∈ L : ¬(Li ⇒ R) ∧ ¬(R ⇒ Li).
For example, assuming the properties L1 (see Equation 9) and L2 (see
Equation 10). The property R, which says that every ﬁrst element 10 of
the time interval t + 2 (∀ t ∈ N) must be equal to the natural number 5
∀ t ∈ N : ft.ti(y , t + 2) = 5,
does not imply L1, because it is only about time intervals 2, 4, 6, 8 etc.,
and it also does not imply L2, because it says nothing about the length
of message list at the time intervals. Neither L1 nor L2 imply R, because
they say nothing about the message values.
The R will be added to the list of requirements L, see Figure 2 (c). If
S does not fulﬁll R, then S must be changed according the new list of
requirements.
The lists of requirements are speciﬁcations itself. Thus, we allude the reﬁne-
ment layers (see Figure 1). If the requirement speciﬁcation can be extended,
we always have a choice:
• either we extend the speciﬁcation itself and don’t make any changes of
the reﬁnement layers
10The ﬁrst element of a message sequence s is denoted by ft.s.
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• or we don’t make any changes of the original speciﬁcation, but add some
new reﬁnement layer with the extended version of the speciﬁcation.
See Section 4.7 for an example.
S
L = L1 ȁ … ȁ Li ȁ … ȁ  Ln
Lƍ U {R}
(a)
S
L = L1 ȁ … ȁ R ȁ … ȁ  Ln
Lƍ U {Li}
(b)
S
L = L1 ȁ … ȁ Li ȁ … ȁ  Lnȁ R
Lƍ
(c)
Fig. 2. Adding new requirement to the list of requirements of the speciﬁcation
The legitimate question is, where we need to argue about such more abstract
requirement like L1 at all having more precise requirements like L2, and why we
cannot just remove them. The point is, that a number of system requirements
comes out from the argumentation about interaction with another components
or systems. Considering a system S3 that consist of two subsystems: the
system S1 and some system S2, and let the channel y be a local one for the
system S3, i.e. this output channel channel of S1 will be an input channel for
S2. Thus, all assumptions of S2 about this input channel y must be fulﬁlled
by S1 as its new requirements.
Assuming we have composite speciﬁcations A, . . . ,Z , their subcomponents
and the corresponding requirements speciﬁcations AReq , . . . ,ZReq . If the re-
ﬁnement relations AReq  A, . . . , ZReq  Z have been proved, these require-
ments can be used to prove properties of a speciﬁcation S , which is composed
of A, . . . ,Z – in most cases it is easier to prove the main lemma using these
requirements speciﬁcation, than to use the architecture speciﬁcations directly
(see Section 4.7 for examples).
4 Automotive-Gateway
This section introduces the case study on telematics (electronic data trans-
mission) gateway that was done for the Verisoft project [10]. If the gateway
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receives from a ECall application of a vehicle a signal about crash (more pre-
cise, the command to initiate the call to the Emergency Service Center), and
after the establishing the connection it receives the command to send the crash
data (these data were already received and stored in the internal buﬀer of the
gateway), these data will be resent to the Emergency Service Center and the
voice communication will be established, assuming that there is no connection
fails.
In this section we discuss at ﬁrst the Focus speciﬁcations of the gateway
system and its requirements. The speciﬁcations are subsequently schemati-
cally translated into Isabelle/HOL using the representation of Focus streams
presented above. After that the proof of the reﬁnement lemmas is discussed.
The reﬁnement lemma says that the gateway architecture speciﬁcation fulﬁlls
its requirements. Since the overall representation of the gateway system in
Focus and Isabelle/HOL as well as the proofs of auxiliary lemmas are too
extensive for this paper, we describe here only some aspect of the speciﬁca-
tions and proofs, and show only a simple and short parts of the speciﬁcations
to give a feeling how the approach works. For the technical details of the case
study we would like to refer to [9].
4.1 Representation of Datatypes
The datatype ECall Info represents a tuple, consisting of the data that the
Emergency Service Center needs – here we specify these data to contain the
vehicle coordinates and the collision speed, they can also extend by some
other information. The datatype GatewayStatus represents the status (inter-
nal state) of the gateway.
type ECall Info = ecall(coord ∈ Coordinates , speed ∈ CollisionSpeed)
type GatewayStatus = { init state, call , connection ok ,
sending data, voice com }
The Isabelle/HOL speciﬁcations of these types are equal modulo syntax to
the corresponding types in the Focus speciﬁcation. To specify the auto-
motive gateway we will use a number of datatypes consisting of one or two
elements: {sc ack}, {init , send}, {vc com} and {stop vc}. We name these
types aType, reqType, vcType and stopType correspondingly, and represent
them in Isabelle/HOL schematically.
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4.2 Gateway System: Architecture and Requirements
The speciﬁcation GatewaySystemReq speciﬁes the requirements on gateway
system: assuming that the input streams req and stop can contain at every
time interval at most one message, and assuming that the stream lose contains
at every time interval exactly one message. The stream lose represents the
connection status: the message true at the time interval t corresponds to the
connection failure at this time interval, the message false at the time interval
t means that at this time interval no data loss on the gateway connection.
GatewaySystemReq(constd ∈ N) timed
in
req : {init , send}; dt : ECall Info;
stop : stop vc; lose : Bool
out ack : GatewayStatus; vc : {vc com}
asm msg1(req) ∧ msg1(stop) ∧ ts(lose)
gar
∀ t , k ∈ N :
ti(ack , t) = 〈init state〉 ∧ ti(req , t + 1) = 〈init〉
∧ ti(req , t + 2) = 〈〉
∧ (∀ t1 ∈ N : t1 ≤ t → ti(req , t1) = 〈〉)
∧ (∀m ∈ N : m ≤ k + 3 → ti(req , t + m) 	= 〈send〉)
∧ ti(req , t + 3 + k) = 〈send〉 ∧ lastti(dt , t + 2) 	= 〈〉
∧ (∀ j ∈ N : j ≤ (4 + k + d + d) → ti(lose, t + j ) = 〈false〉)
→
ti(vc, t + 4 + k + d + d) = 〈vc com〉
If
• at any time interval t the gateway system is in the initial state,
ti(ack , t) = 〈init state〉, and
• at time interval t + 1 the signal about crash comes at ﬁrst time (more
precise, the command to initiate the call to the Emergency Service Cen-
ter),
ti(req , t + 1) = 〈init〉 ∧ (∀ t1 ∈ N : t1 ≤ t → ti(req , t1) = 〈〉), and
• after 3 +m time intervals the command to send the crash data comes at
ﬁrst time
(∀m ∈ N : m ≤ k + 3→ ti(req , t + m) = 〈send〉) ∧ ti(req , t + 3 + k) =
〈send〉, and
• the gateway system has received until the time interval t + 2 the crash
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data,
lastti(dt , t + 2) = 〈〉, and
• there is no connection fails from the time interval t until the time interval
t + 4 + k + 2d ,
∀ j ∈ N : j ≤ (4 + k + d + d)→ ti(lose, t + j ) = 〈false〉
then at time interval t + 4 + k + 2d the voice communication is established,
ti(vc, t + 4 + k + d + d) = 〈vc com〉.
The Focus speciﬁcation of the gateway system and the Focus representation
of the speciﬁcation GatewaySystem as plain text are presented below:
GatewaySystem(constd ∈ N) glass-box
Gateway(d)
ServiceCenter
req: {init, send}
ack: GatewayStatus 
i : ECall_Info
a: {sc_ack}
vc: {vc_com}
dt : ECall_Info
stop: {stop_vc}
lose: Bool
GatewaySystem(constd ∈ N) timed
in
req : {init , send}; dt : ECall Info;
stop : stop vc; lose : Bool
out ack : GatewayStatus; vc : {vc com}
loc a : {sc ack}; i : ECall Info
(ack , i , vc) := Gateway(d)(req , dt , a, stop, lose)
(a) := ServiceCenter(i)
On the example of these two speciﬁcations we show the results of the spec-
iﬁcation translation from Focus to Isabelle/HOL. 11 We convert the Fo-
cus speciﬁcations GatewaySystem and GatewaySystemReq into Isabelle/HOL
predicates GatewaySystemReq and GatewaySystem respectively. This trans-
lation is done schematically, according to the approach “Focus on Isabelle”.
11 For the whole version of the translation as well as the technical details we would like to
refer to [9].
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constdefs
GatewaySystem ::
reqType istream ⇒ ECall Info istream ⇒
stopType istream ⇒ bool istream ⇒ nat ⇒
GatewayStatus istream ⇒ vcType istream ⇒ bool
GatewaySystem req dt stop lose d ack vc
≡ ∃ a i . (Gateway req dt a stop lose d ack i vc) ∧ (ServiceCenter i a)
constdefs
GatewaySystemReq ::
reqType istream ⇒ ECall Info istream ⇒
stopType istream ⇒ bool istream ⇒ nat ⇒
GatewayStatus istream ⇒ vcType istream ⇒ bool
GatewaySystemReq req dt stop lose d ack vc
≡
((msg (1 ::nat) req) ∧ (msg (1 ::nat) stop) ∧ (ts lose))
−→
(∀ (t ::nat) (k ::nat).
( ack t = [init state] ∧ req (Suc t) = [init ]
∧ (∀ t1 . t1 ≤ t −→ req t1 = []) ∧ req (t+2 ) = []
∧ (∀ m. m < k + 3 −→ req (t + m) 	= [send ])
∧ req (t+3+k) = [send ] ∧ inf last ti dt (t+2 ) 	= []
∧ (∀ (j ::nat).
j ≤ (4 + k + d + d) −→ lose (t+j ) = [False])
−→ vc (t + 4 + k + d + d) = [vc com]) )
4.3 ECall Service Center
The component ServiceCenter represents the behavior of the Emergency (ECall)
Service Center from the gateway point of view: if at time t a message about
a vehicle crash comes, it acknowledges this event by sending the at time t +1
message sc ack that represents the attempt to establish the voice communica-
tion with the driver or a passenger of the vehicle (voice communication output
message of the Gateway component) – if there is no connection failure, after
d time intervals the voice communication will be started.
4.4 Gateway: Requirements Speciﬁcation
We deﬁne the formal speciﬁcation of the gateway requirement, presented in
the previous section, as Focus speciﬁcation GatewayReq :
(i) If at time t the gateway is in the initial state init state, and it gets
the command to establish the connection with the central station, and
also there is no environment connection problems during the next 2 time
intervals, it establishes the connection at the time interval t + 2,
ti(ack , t + 2) = 〈connection ok〉.
(ii) If at time t the gateway has establish the connection,
ti(ack , t) = 〈connection ok〉, and it gets the command to send the E-Call
data to the central station (ti(req , t + 1) = 〈send〉), and also there is no
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environment connection problems during the next d + 1 time intervals,
∀ k ∈ N : k ≤ d + 1 → ti(lose, t + k) = 〈false〉, then it sends the last
corresponding data. 12 The central station becomes these date at the
time t + d .
(iii) If the gateway becomes the acknowledgment from the central station that
it has receives the sent E-Call data, and also there is no environment
connection problems, then the voice communication is started.
GatewayReq(constd ∈ N) timed
in
req : {init connect}; dt : ECall Info; a : {sc ack};
stop : stop vc; lose : Bool
out ack : GatewayStatus; i : ECall Info; vc : {voice com}
asm msg1(req) ∧ msg1(a) ∧ msg1(stop) ∧ ts(lose)
gar
∀ t ∈ N :
ti(ack , t) = 〈init state〉 ∧ ti(req , t + 1) = 〈init〉
∧ ti(lose, t + 1) = 〈false〉 ∧ ti(lose, t + 2) = 〈false〉
→ ti(ack , t + 2) = 〈connection ok〉
ti(ack , t) = 〈connection ok〉 ∧ ti(req , t + 1) = 〈send〉
∧ (∀ k ∈ N : k ≤ d + 1 → ti(lose, t + k) = 〈false〉)
→ ti(i , t + d + 1) = lastti(dt , t) ∧ ti(ack , t + 1) = 〈sending data〉
ti(ack , t + d) = 〈sending data〉 ∧ ti(a, t + 1) = 〈sc ack〉
∧ (∀ k ∈ N : k ≤ d + 1 → ti(lose, t + k) = 〈false〉)
→ ti(vc, t + d + 1) = 〈vc com〉
4.5 Gateway: Architecture Speciﬁcation
The speciﬁcation of the gateway architecture, Gateway, is parameterized one:
the parameter d ∈ N denotes the communication delay (between the central
station and a vehicle). This component consists of three subcomponents:
Sample, Delay, and Loss.
12The Focus operator lastti(s,t) returns the last nonempty time interval of the stream s
until the tth time interval. If until the time t all intervals were empty, the empty message
list is returned.
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Gateway(constd ∈ N) timed
Delay(d)i1 : ECall_Info
vc: {vc_com}
Sample
ack:
GatewayStatus
a1: {sc_ack}req: {init, send}
dt : ECall_Info
stop: {stop_vc}
Loss
i2 : ECall_Info i : ECall_Info
lose: Bool
a: {sc_ack}a2: {sc_ack}
We omit here the Focus speciﬁcations of this subcomponents and their trans-
lation in Isabelle/HOL, and give just a short description of them.
The component Sample represents the logic of the gateway component.
If it receives from a ECall application of a vehicle the command to initiate
the call to the Emergency Service Center it tries to establish the connection.
If the connection is established, and the component Sample receives from a
ECall application of a vehicle the command to send the crash data, which
were already received and stored in the internal buﬀer of the gateway, these
data will be resent to the Emergency Service Center. After that this com-
ponent waits to the acknowledgment from the Emergency Service Center. If
the acknowledgment is received, the voice communication will be established,
assuming that there is no connection fails.
The component Delay models the communication delay. Its speciﬁcation
is parameterized one: it inherits the parameter of the component Gateway.
This component simply delays all input messages on d time intervals. During
the ﬁrst d time intervals no output message will be produced.
The component Loss models the communication loss between the central
station and the vehicle gateway: if during time interval t from the component
Loss Oracle no message about a lost connection comes, ti(lose,t) = 〈false〉,
the messages come during time interval t via the input channels a and i2 will
be forwarded without any delay via channels a2 and i respectively. Otherwise
all messages come during time interval t will be lost.
4.6 Reﬁnement Layers
The speciﬁcation group Automotive-Gateway consists of the following compo-
nents components: GatewaySystemReq, GatewaySystem, ServiceCenter, Gate-
wayReq, Gateway, Sample, Delay, and Loss. The corresponding reﬁnement
layers of the speciﬁcation group are presented on Figure 3.
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GatewaySystemReq
ServiceCenterGatewayReq
Gateway
GatewaySystem
DelaySample
Layer  0
Layer  1
Loss
Layer  2
Fig. 3. Reﬁnement Layers of the Speciﬁcation Group Automotive-Gateway
4.7 Veriﬁcation
In this section we discuss the proof that the speciﬁed automotive-gateway
system architecture fulﬁlls its speciﬁed requirements. First of all we need to
show that the speciﬁed architecture of the gateway component itself fulﬁlls
the corresponding requirements. We deﬁne and prove the following lemma, 13
which says that the speciﬁcation Gateway is a reﬁnement of the speciﬁcation
GatewayReq :
lemma Gateway L0:
Gateway req dt a stop lose d ack i vc =⇒
GatewayReq req dt a stop lose d ack i vc
To show that the speciﬁed system architecture fulﬁlls the requirements we
need to show that the speciﬁcation GatewaySystem is a reﬁnement of the
speciﬁcation GatewaySystemReq. Therefore, we deﬁne and prove the follow-
ing lemma: 14
lemma GatewaySystem L0:
GatewaySystem req dt stop lose d ack vc =⇒
13The optimized proof is ca. 1200 lines of proof.
14The optimized proof is ca. 600 lines of proof.
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GatewaySystemReq req dt stop lose d ack vc
In the proof of this lemma we have used ﬁrst of all the deﬁnitions of the
predicates GatewaySystemReq and GatewaySystem, and clarify the resulting
goal. After that we add two new assumptions to the goal:
• The stream a has at very time interval at most one message. 15 This
assumption is necessary as one of the gateway assumptions about the
environment.
• The predicate GatewayReq holds for the corresponding streams, i.e. that
the gateway fulﬁlls its requirements (according lemmaGateway L0 ). This
assumption is needed to simplify the proof – now we can prove a number
of system properties directly from the properties of the gateway, without
extraction the deﬁnitions of the gateway architecture and the properties
of its components.
Proving the lemma GatewaySystem L0, we found out a number of gateway
properties which can be seen as requirements to the gateway:
• If at the tth point in time the gateway has establish the connection,
and it does not get any command to send the E-Call data to the central
station until the (t + k)th time interval, and also there is no environment
connection problems during these time intervals, then it stays it the same
state waiting for the command to send the E-Call data.
• If at tth time interval the gateway is in the initial state, and at time
interval t + 1 the signal about crash comes at ﬁrst time, and after 3 +m
time intervals the command to send the crash data comes at ﬁrst time,
and there is no connection fails from the time t until the (t + 3 + k)th
time interval, then until the (t + 3 + k + d)th time interval the output
stream i contains no messages.
• If before the tth point in time the gateway has send the E-Call data, but
time interval became no acknowledgment from the central station until
the (t + d)th point in time, and also there is no environment connection
problems, then it stays it the same state waiting for the acknowledgment.
We can add these properties to the speciﬁcation of the gateway requirements.
The extended version of the gateway requirements speciﬁcation GatewayReq-
Ext is shown below (the new requirements are marked with green color).
The speciﬁed gateway architecture fulﬁlls certainly the extended requirements,
i.e. that the speciﬁcation Gateway is a reﬁnement of the speciﬁcation by the
15This stream goes from the central station to the gateway, see Section 4.2.
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following lemma (the speciﬁcation GatewayReqExt is then translated schemat-
ically into the Isabelle/HOL predicate GatewayReqExt): 16
lemma Gateway Ext:
Gateway req dt a stop lose d ack i vc =⇒
GatewayReqExt req dt a stop lose d ack i vc
The speciﬁed requirements of the gateway component (speciﬁcation Gate-
wayReq) are not strong enough to prove the system properties without ex-
traction the deﬁnitions of the gateway architecture and the properties of its
components, but using the extended version of the gateway requirements spec-
iﬁcation, we can make such kind of proofs. This means that we can shift a
part of proof to the upper reﬁnement layer to optimize the proof structure. 17
Thus, we need either replace the speciﬁcation GatewayReq on the reﬁne-
ment layer 1 (see Figure 3) by the speciﬁcation GatewayReqExt or add a new
reﬁnement layer with the extended version of the speciﬁcation of requirements
(see Fugure 4) to make the whole proof structure more clear and reusable.
16The optimized proof is ca. 1500 lines of proof, but the proofs of the new auxiliary lemmas
are very similar to the proofs of the corresponding parts of the lemma GatewaySystem L0.
17The optimized proof of the corresponding lemma GatewaySystem L0ext is ca. 300 lines
of proof.
M. Spichkova / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 214 (2008) 131–157154
GatewayReqExt(constd ∈ N) timed
in
req : {init connect}; dt : ECall Info; a : {sc ack};
stop : stop vc; lose : Bool
out ack : GatewayStatus; i : ECall Info; vc : {voice com}
univ k ∈ N
asm msg1(req) ∧ msg1(a) ∧ msg1(stop) ∧ ts(lose)
gar
∀ t ∈ N :
ti(ack , t) = 〈init state〉 ∧ ti(req , t + 1) = 〈init〉
∧ ti(lose, t + 1) = 〈false〉 ∧ ti(lose, t + 2) = 〈false〉
→ ti(ack , t + 2) = 〈connection ok〉
ti(ack , t) = 〈init state〉 ∧ ti(req , t + 1) = 〈init〉
∧ ti(req , t + 3 + k) = 〈send〉
∧ ∀ t1 ≤ t : ti(req , t1) = 〈〉 ∧ ∀m ≤ k + 3 : ti(req , t + m) 	= 〈send〉
∧ ∀ j ≤ k + d + 3 : ti(lose, t + j ) = 〈false〉
→ ∀ t2 ≤ t + 3 + k + d : ti(i , t2) = 〈〉
ti(ack , t) = 〈connection ok〉 ∧ ∀m ≤ k : ti(req , t + m) 	= 〈send〉
∧ ∀ j ≤ k : ti(lose, t + j ) = 〈false〉
→ ∀ y ≤ k : ti(ack , t + y) = 〈connection ok〉
ti(ack , t) = 〈connection ok〉 ∧ ti(req , t + 1) = 〈send〉
∧ (∀ k ∈ N : k ≤ d + 1 → ti(lose, t + k) = 〈false〉)
→ ti(i , t + d + 1) = lastti(dt , t) ∧ ti(ack , t + 1) = 〈sending data〉
ti(ack , t) = 〈sending data〉 ∧ ∀ t3 ≤ t + d : ti(a, t3) = 〈〉
∧ ∀ j ≤ d + d : ti(lose, t + j ) = 〈false〉
→ ∀ x ≤ d + d : ti(ack , t + x) = 〈sending data〉
ti(ack , t + d) = 〈sending data〉 ∧ ti(a, t + 1) = 〈sc ack〉
∧ (∀ k ∈ N : k ≤ d + 1 → ti(lose, t + k) = 〈false〉)
→ ti(vc, t + d + 1) = 〈vc com〉
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GatewaySystemReq
ServiceCenterGatewayReq
GatewayReqExt
Gateway
GatewaySystem
DelaySample
Layer  0
Layer  1
Layer  3
Loss
Layer  2
Fig. 4. Extended Reﬁnement Layers of the Speciﬁcation Group Automotive-Gateway
4.8 Results of the Case Study
In this case study we have shown how we can verify larger systems using the
idea of the reﬁnement-based veriﬁcation. The Focus speciﬁcations of all com-
ponents of the gateway system were translated schematically to Isabelle/HOL
and the reﬁnement relation between the requirement and the architecture
speciﬁcation was proved both for the gateway component and for the gateway
system. We also present an example of extension of the requirements speciﬁ-
cation by the new properties found out during the veriﬁcation. After that the
proof of a number of system properties were done directly from the properties
of the gateway, without extraction the deﬁnitions of the gateway architecture
and the properties of its components. The proof of the gateway system prop-
erties using the extended version of the gateway requirements takes ca. 50%
of the proof for the non-extended version.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present the idea of the reﬁnement-based veriﬁcation. We
treat any proof about a system as the proof that a more concrete system
speciﬁcation is a reﬁnement of a more abstract one. The case when one needs
to prove a single property of a system speciﬁcation S can also be seen as a
reﬁnement relation.
We introduce the representation of the reﬁnement layers of a speciﬁcation
group and the general ways of their representation in Isabelle/HOL as well as
the deﬁnition of the strict behavioral reﬁnement. After that we discuss the
representation in Isabelle/HOL of diﬀerent kinds of reﬁnement – behavioral,
interface, and conditional reﬁnement – and how the ideas of the reﬁnement-
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based veriﬁcation can be used in the framework “Focus on Isabelle” [9]. Given
two speciﬁcations, represented in a formal speciﬁcation framework Focus, our
method “Focus on Isabelle” validates the reﬁnement relation between them
by translating the speciﬁcations to a Higher Order Logic and subsequent using
the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL.
The presented case study, veriﬁcation of the gateway system speciﬁcation,
showed the feasibility of the approach. Doing the veriﬁcation in Isabelle/HOL
of the ﬁrst versions of the Focus speciﬁcation of the gateway system we found
out a number of properties to extend the gateway requirement speciﬁcation.
The proof of the gateway system properties using the extended version of the
gateway requirements takes ca. 50% of the proof for the non-extended version.
Thus, using the idea of the reﬁnement-based veriﬁcation we get more clear
and reusable proof structure.
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